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I
NATURE OF THE CASE
This action involves a Petition for Writ of Habeus Corpus
filed in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County.
Appellant's petition was filed on or about April 24, 1985.

The

lower court entered an order denying appellant1s petition on or
about November 6, 1985.

The appellant appeals from that order of

the lower court.
II
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeus Corpus came on
for disposition before the lower court pursuant to stipulated
facts of the parties, and their cross-briefs to the lower court
as to the issues of law.

After the court had reviewed the

stipulated facts and the parties1 memorandums as to the law, the
court below denied petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeus
1

Corpus, and entered an amended order to that effect on or about
November 6, 1985•

This judgment was timely appealed by

petitioner.
Ill
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment and order below and
a determination of this Court that appellant is entitled to a
Writ of Habeus Corpus.
Appellant further seeks a determination of this Court that
the lower court erred in ruling that appellant1s Petition for a
Writ of Habeus Corpus was not timely filed, and was time barred
pursuant to the terms and conditions of Utah Code Annotated,
Section 78-12-31.1 (1979) and a determination that the lower
court erred in ruling that appellant's application should be
denied for reason that he was not prejudiced by the delay in
having his parole revocation heard.
IV
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following statement of facts is taken from the parties'
stipulation as to the relevant facts which was filed with the
lower court on or about August 23, 1985:
Appellant, Louis Malek, is presently incarcerated at the
Utah State Prison.

He was previously committed to the Utah State

Prison on May 18, 1977, after entering a plea of guilty to the
charge of manslaughter in the Third Judicial District Court in
2

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya,
Judge presiding.

Appellant was conditionally released by the

Board of Pardons of the State of Utah on parole on May 11, 1982.
On or about February 28, 1983, appellant was arrested and
incarcerated in the Utah County Jail upon charges that he had
committed the crimes of aggravated robbery and attempted murder.
On March 18, 1985, an order and warrant ot arrest was issued by
the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah upon a Complaint made
to the Board of Pardons that appellant had violated the terms and
conditions of his parole, and appellant was served with this
warrant.

Appellant requested a pre-revocation hearing before the

Board of Pardons which was scheduled for March 18, 1983.
Directly prior to the pre-revocation hearing, appellant elected
to waive his pre-revocation hearing and he signed a waiver of his
pre-revocation hearing on March 18, 1983.

Appellant was found

guilty of the charges of aggravated robbery and attempted murder
in the Fourth District Court on July 8, 1983, and on this date,
appellant was remanded to the custody of the Utah State Prison to
serve a prison sentence which had been imposed by the Fourth
District Court.

The State of Utah Board of Pardons scheduled

appellant to appear before the Board of Pardons for a parole
violation hearing on May 23, 1984.

Notice of this hearing was

mailed to appellant at the Utah State Prison by the Board of
Pardons on May 17, 1984.

Between July 8, 1983 and May 23, 1984,

the State ot Utah Board of Pardons took no action to schedule the

3

appellant's parole revocation hearing before the State of Utah
Board of Pardons, and took no action to adjudicate the issue of
the appellant's alleged parole violation before the State of Utah
Board of Pardons. Appellant objected to the Board ot Pardons
hearing scheduled for May 23, 1984, alleging that he did not have
adequate notice of this parole violation hearing.

He requested a

continuance of this hearing and the matter of his parole
violation was continued to July 25, 1984. The State of Utah
Board ot Pardons entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
an Order on January 8, 1985, finding that appellant did, in fact,
violate his parole, and revoking appellant's parole which had
been granted in 1982. A re-hearing on the matter of appellant's
parole was scheduled tor July of 1988.
On April 24, 1985, appellant petitioned the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County for issuance of a Writ
of Habeus Corpus, alleging that appellant was illegally
restrained in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-27-11
and in violation of his rights to due process and equal
protection and his rights to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment.
Appellant's Petition for a Writ of Habeus Corpus was denied,
and a final order denying his Petition tor a Writ of Habeus
Corpus was signed and entered by the lower court on November 6,
1985.

From that final order, appellant has filed a timely notice

of appeal.
4

V
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE STATE OF UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS HAS
VIOLATED THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, SECTION 77-27-7.

The portion of Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-27-7 which is
applicable to the instant case reads as follows:
(1) The Board of Pardons shall determine within
six months after the date of an offender's commitment
for a felony offense, a date upon which the offender
shall be afforded a hearing to establish a date of
release or a date for rehearing, and shall promptly
notify the offender of the date.
Louis Malek is clearly an "offender" within the meaning of
Section 77-27-7.

He was committed to the Utah State Prison for a

felony offense on or about July 8, 1983.

Pursuant to the terms

and conditions of this statute, appellant was entitled to a date
from the Board of Pardons upon which the appellant would be
afforded a hearing to establish a release date or a date for a
hearing, and he was entitled to receive this date no later than
January 8, 1984.

Appellant was not notified of any hearing date

until May ot 1984, and he was not actually given a hearing until
July of 1984, over six months after he was entitled to such a
hearing.

He was not given a date ot release or a date for

rehearing until January, 1985, almost 18 months after he was
entitled to receive such a release date or re-hearing date.
Moreover, appellant was entitled to be notified promptly of
the decision of the Board regarding his release date or
5

re-hearing date.

Even though he went before the Board in July of

1984, he was not notified of the decision of the Board until
January of 1985, six month after his hearing date.
Clearly, the Board has violated both the six month hearing
and the prompt notification requirements of Section 77-27-7.
POINT II: RESPONDENTS HAVE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S
RIGHTS IN THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE VIOLATED
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO HAVE A HEARING ON THE
MATTER OF HIS PAROLE REVOCATION WITHIN A
REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME, AND HAVE FAILED TO
NOTIFY APPELLANT PROPERLY OF THE DECISION
REGARDING HIS PAROLE REVOCATION.
The section of the Utah Code Annotated which deals with the
matter of parole revocation is Utah Code Annotated, Section
77-27-11.

(See Appendix "A" to this brief for a full text of the

statute.)

This statute sets torth the procedure which must be

followed by the Board in order to revoke the parole of a parolee.
The statute does not provide a time limit during which the Board
must conduct a hearing regarding the parolee's revocation of
parole.

However, it does state in subsection (5) that "the

parolee shall be promptly notified in writing of the Board's
findings and decision [regarding parole revocation]."
Since the Utah Code does not provide a time limit during
which a final parole revocation hearing must be held, then common
law regarding the rights of due process which must be afforded to
parolees will govern.
A parolee's due process rights were established in the
United States Supreme Court decision of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
6

U.S. 471 (1972).

In the Morrissey decision, the Supreme Court

stated:
There must also be an opportunity for a hearing if it
is desired by the parolee prior to the final decision
on revocation by the parole authority. This hearing
must be the basis for more than determining probable
cause; it must lead to a final evaluation of any
contested relevant facts in consideration of whether
the facts as determined warrant revocation. . . . The
revocation hearing must be tendered within a reasonable
time after the parolee is taken into custody. A lapse
of two months, as respondents suggest occurrs in some
cases, would not appear to be unreasonable. (emphasis
added.) (At pages 487 and 488.)
Subsequent to the Morrissey decision, the Federal courts
have established that it is per se reasonable to conduct a parole
revocation hearing within 90 days of the date a parolee is taken
into custody, and that it is per se unreasonable to have a parole
revocation hearing more than 90 days after the parolee is taken
into custody.

See, for example, Carmel v. U. S. Parole

Commission, 489 F. Supp. 113 (So. Dist. of N. Y. 1980); Smith v.
U. S., 577 F.2d 1025 (Ct. App. 5 Ga. 1978); Beck v. Wilkes, 589
F.2d 901, cert, denied, 444 U. S. 485 (Ct. App. 5 Ga. 1979).
Where the rights of parolees are concerned, Utah State
guarantees of due process should be interpretted identically to
the Federal guarantees of due process.
In the instant case, appellant was "taken into custody" with
regard to his alleged parole violation when the Board issued its
order and warrant of arrest on March 18, 1983.

Federal and State

due process requirements mandated that appellant have a hearing

7

on the matter of his parole revocation within three months of
that date, oxr by June 18, 1983.
The Board of Pardons continued the hearing on appellant's
parole revocation pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings
against appellant in the Fourth District Court of Provo, Utah,
Those Utah County proceedings were terminated effective July 8,
1983, when appellant was found guilty of the charges against him
and committed to the custody of the Utah State Prison, Even
assuming that the 90 day time period did not begin to elapse
until appellant was committed to the Utah State Prison by the
courts of Utah County, the Board was still under an obligation to
have a hearing as to the issue of his parole revocation no later
than October 8, 1983. The hearing was not scheduled until May of
1984, and was not actually held until July of 1984, over nine
months past the time when the Board was constitutionally required
to hold such a hearing.
Furthermore, the Board did not notify appellant of its
decision on his parole revocation until January of 1985, six
months after the hearing date.

This was an unreasonable time to

delay in notifying appellant of the Board's decision, and
constituted violation of Utah Code Annotated, Section
77-27-11(5).
The respondents have violated both appellant's due process
rights at common law, and his right pursuant to Utah statute to
be notified within a reasonable time period of a decision of the
8

Board regarding his parole revocation.
POINT III:

THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR THE VIOLATION
OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS WHICH HAS OCCURRED
IS THE RELEASE OF APPELLANT.

The only appropriate remedy appellant is release.

To give

appellant any less than this remedy is to afford appellant rights
without any remedy for breach of those rights.

To give appellant

any less than this remedy is to render the entire section of the
Utah Code Annotated dealing with the Board of Pardons
meaningless.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of United
States v. Revis, 525 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975) held that a delay
in the revocation hearing for a parolee mandated the release of
the parolee pursuant to his Writ of Habeus Corpus.

The court in

Revis stated as follows:
[T]o order anything less than petitioner's release from
the restraint of the violation warrant would be to
provide petitioner a right without a remedy, the
Federal courts have recognized that unjustified delay
in providing a revocation hearing requires the issuance
of a Writ of Habeus Corpus. See e.g. United States ex
rel Buono v. Kenton, 287 F.2d 534, 536 (2d Cir. 1961) ;
Sutherland v. District of Columbia Board of Parole, 366
F. Supp. 270, 273 (DDC 1974); United States ex rel
Hitchcock v. Kenton, 256 F. Supp. 296, 301 (D. Conn.
1966). (At page 639.)
Respondents may argue that Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78
(1976) is controlling in this instance for the proposition that
appellant was not constitutionally entitled to a speedy hearing
on the matter of his parole revocation.

The facts of the Moody

are easily distinguishable from the instant case.

9

In Moody, the

appellant had been released on parole and had committed two
homicides which were alleged to constitute a violation of his
parole and had been convicted of two additional felony counts for
the homicides in addition to the underlying charges which had
given rise to his parole.

In Moody, the parole board elected not

to serve the appellant with a warrant of arrest for his alleged
parole violation and instead elected to allow the appellant Moody
to serve his sentence for the two homicides before the parole
board there considered the matter of his parole revocation.

The

Moody court held that the appellant was not entitled to a hearing
on the matter of his parole revocation within a set period of
time, and held that the parole board could delay service of the
warrant for parole revoction pending completion of the second
prison sentence.
In the case at bar, the Utah State Board of Pardons elected
to serve the warrant of arrest for the parole revocation upon
appellant Malek in March of 1983.

Since the Board elected to

serve the arrest warrant, they became obligated to afford
appellant due process in carrying out the results of issuing and
serving that warrant.
It should be noted that the Revis decision, supra, was later
reversed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in reliance upon
the Moody decision for reason that the facts of the Revis case
were identical to the facts of the Moody v. Daggett case.

The

Revis court reversed itself on the issue of liability, not on the
10

question of the appropriate remedy if liability had been found.
The Revis holding that release is an appropriate remedy for
violation of a parolee's rights to due process still stands.
Respondents have also argued, and the lower court has found,
that appellant is obligated to show both a violation of his
rights to due process and prejudice because of that violation
before the court may grant him the remedy of release.

The lower

court has erred in imposing this two-fold obligation upon the
appellant and has erred in finding that appellant has not been
prejudiced by the delay in affording him the hearings to which he
was entitled.
It is the position of the Federal courts that a petitioner
for a Writ of Habeus Corpus is obligated to show both a violation
of his rights to due process and prejudice because of that
violation before a court may grant him the remedy of release.
This position of the Federal courts has been taken in
interpreting 18 United States Code, Section 4214 which was
enacted in 1976.

This Federal statute sets the "reasonable time"

during which a parole revocation hearing must be held to be 90
days.

In the Federal system, various courts have considered

whether or not release of an inmate is an appropriate remedy for
violation of this 90 day period.

Numerous Federal courts have

held that an inmate must show both violation of Section 4214 and
prejudice as a result of that violation before an inmate may be
released upon a Writ of Habeus Corpus.
11

However, the Federal

courts, in reaching this decision, have relied upon the
legislative history of Section 4214 which reveals that it was not
the intention of the United States Congress to authorize the
release of inmates for violation of this code section.

See, for

example, Northington v. United States Parole Commission, 587 F.2d
2 (Ca. 6, 1978).
Apellant Malek's Petition for a Writ of Habeus Corpus is not
predicated upon United States statute, but is predicated on
federal and state guarantees of due process and upon Utah state
statute.

Therefore, the legislative history of 18 United States

Code, Section 4214 is not applicable to the case of the
appellant, and Federal court decisions which held that an inmate
whose parole revocation hearing is not held within 90 days of the
date of arrest must show actual prejudice in order to gain
release are not applicable.
Further, the delay which has occurred in appellant's case is
not a delay of a mere week or month or even several months. The
delay in this case is in excess of nine months, and this court
should find prejudice per se in delaying a revocation hearing for
a period of nine months.

During such a lengthy delay, it is only

reasonable that appellant would be prejudiced by loss of
witnesses, fading memories and the disability of incarceration in
preparing his hearing before the Board.

Further, appellant has

suffered prejudice caused by the mental anguish and stress of
incarceration without knowing exactly the terms of that
12

incarceration or the time when that incarceration will end.
POINT IV:

APPELLANT'S ACTION HAS BEEN TIMELY FILED.

Respondents have contended that appellant's petition was not
timely filed, and the lower court so found.

This decision on the

part of the lower court was error and should be reversed by this
court.
The statute in issue is Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-12-31.1 (1979), which reads as follows:
[WJithin three months: for relief pursuant to a Writ
of Habeus Corpus. This limitation shall apply not only
as to grounds known to petitioner, but also to grounds
which in the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have been known by petitioner or counsel for
petitioner.
Respondents have contended that appellant Malek knew he had
not had a parole revocation within 90 days of his being taken
into custody by no later than October 8, 1983.

They will assert

that the statute of limitations thus ran on his petition as to
the timeliness of his parole revocation hearing no later than
January 8, 1984.

Further, they will contend that appellant knew

the six month time period for a hearing date on his new felony
conviction passed on January 8, 1984, and that his statute of
limitations on this issue thus ran out on April 8, 1984.
Respondents' and the lower court's interpretation of Section
78-12-31.1 is in error.

First, it fails to account for Utah Code

Annotated, Section 78-12-36 (1975), which states as follows:
If a person entitled to bring an action, other
than for recovery of real property, is at the time the
13

cause of action accrued, either:
• • • •

. . . (3) imprisoned on a criminal charge or in
execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a
term less than for life;-the time of such disability is not a part of the
time limited for the commencement of the action.
Appellant meets all requirements of Section 78-12-36 for
tolling of the statute of limitations in question.

He has been

imprisoned on criminal charges and/or under the sentence of a
criminal court continuously since February, 1983, well before his
cause of action arose in this case.

Since he is incarcerated for

indeterminant sentences from the Third and Fourth District
Courts, he is serving a sentence for a term less than life.
Hence, the statute of limitations had not even begun to run
against appellant when he commenced this action.
Second, even ignoring Section 78-12-36, respondents
mischaracterized the limitation imposed by Section 78-12-31.1.
Appellant has suffered a continuing violation of his rights to
due process and a continuing violation of the statutes of the
State of Utah each and every day he has been incarcerated since
the time he should have been granted a hearing in 1983 or 1984.
Because appellant1s problem is a continuing one, each day has
given rise to a new cause of action and a new period of
limitation.

For this continuing violation of appellant's rights,

the period of limitation has not run.
14

VI
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the lower court
should be reversed, and appellant's Writ of Habeus Corpus should
be granted, authorizing the release forthwith of appellant.
DATED THIS f3

day of

/£^/ru,*^V

1986.

CORPORON & WILLIAMS

:ORPO|
foc^wpellant

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be served upon respondents
four true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellate Brief,
including any attachments, by hand-delivering the same to:
CARLIE CHRISTENSEN
Attorney tor Respondents
Attorney General's Office
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
on the f*%

da

Y °f February, 1986.
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APPENDIX "A"

77-27-11.
Revocation of parole. (1) The board may revoke
the parole ot any person who is found to have violated condition
of his parole.
(2)
If a parolee is detained by the Department of
Corrections or any law enforcement official for a suspected
violation
of parole, the Department of Corrections shall
immediately report the alleged violation to the board, by means
of incident report, and make any recommendation regarding the
incident.
No parolee may be held for a period longer than 72
hours, excluding weekends and holidays without first obtaining a
warrant.
(3)
Any member of the board may issue a warrant based upon
a certified warrant request to a peace officer or other persons
authorized to arrest, detain and return to actual custody a
parolee, and may upon arrest or otherwise direct the Department
of Corrections to determine if there is probably cause to believe
the parolee has violated the conditions of his parole.
(4)
Upon a finding of probable cause, a parolee may be
further detained or imprisoned again pending a hearing by the
board.
(5)
The board shall conduct a hearing on the alleged
violation of parole, and a statement of the evidence against him.
Te board shall provide the parolee the opportunity to be present,
be represented by counsel, to be heard, to present witnesses and
documentary evidence, and to contront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses, absent a showing of good cause for not allowing the
controntation.
Decisions shall be reached by majority vote of
the members of the board sitting and the parolee shall be
promptly notified m writing of the board1s finding and decision.
(6)
Parolees found to have violated the conditions of
parole may, at the discretion of the board, be returned to
parole, have restitution ordered, or be imprisoned again as
determined by the board, not to exceed the maximum term, or be
subject to any other conditions the board may impose within its
discretion.
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